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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken by Defendant-Appellant Dr. Leo W. Hardy ("Dr. Hardy") 
from the trial court's grant of summary judgment and entry of final judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff-Appellee Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"). The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court's grant of UBMC's summary judgment motion on 
remand consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Uintah Basin Medical 
Center v. Hardy (hereinafter, "UBMC /"), 2002 UT 92, ffi[ 17-19, 54 P.3d 1165? 
a. Standard of Review. "When reviewing the district court's 
application of our mandate, we consider whether the court abused the limited discretion 
that our mandate left to it." Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121, 1125 
(10th Cir. 2003); cf. Phebus v. Dunford, 198 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1948) (stating that the 
issues decided upon by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal "may not be acted upon or 
decided contrary to the way they were decided by this court"). 
2. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to UBMC where the 
undisputed facts show that the duration of the professional services agreement between 
UBMC and Dr. Hardy was unreasonable? 
a. Standard of Review. This Court reviews the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to UBMC for correctness. View Condominium Owners Ass yn v. 
MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT App 104, U 14, P.3d . "In reviewing a decision made 
on summary judgment, [this Court] considers] whether the trial court correctly ruled that 
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no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 16, 84 P.3d 1134. 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to reopen discovery on remand and 
instead allow development of the record as it existed after remand? 
a. Standard of Review. This Court's review of the trial court's 
determination not to reopen discovery is for abuse of discretion. Grynberg v. Questar 
Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 56, 70 P.3d 1; Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., 
Inc., 2002 UT 39,116, 48 P.3d 910. 
b. Preservation of the Issue. Because Dr. Hardy failed to comply with 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking additional discovery below, he 
has not properly preserved the issue for appeal, and this Court need not address it. See 
Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, \ 57 (declining to reach issue of request for additional discovery 
where plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 56(f) before the trial court); Jackson v. 
Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1987) (same). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action, which has been pending for almost eight years and is now on appeal 
for the second time, involves the interpretation and construction of a 1994 agreement for 
professional services (hereinafter, the "Agreement") between UBMC and Dr. Hardy, a 
pathologist who worked for two other hospitals in addition to UBMC. Pursuant to the 
Agreement, Dr. Hardy visited UBMC once a week for approximately two hours per visit 
while on his way from his main hospital in Price, Utah, to his other hospital in Vernal, 
2 
Utah. Although the Agreement did not set forth a specific term, it provided that either 
party could terminate the Agreement upon the occurrence of "just cause." UBMC 
terminated the agreement approximately two years after the effective date. Because 
Dr. Hardy believed that UBMC's termination of the Agreement was wrongful, he 
threatened UBMC with litigation. UBMC subsequently commenced this action by filing 
a request for declaratory relief. See R. at 4. 
Approximately three years after the commencement of the action, the trial court 
granted summary judgment to UBMC. Dr. Hardy appealed this ruling to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded for further proceedings. UBMC /, 2002 
UT 92, m 17-19. On remand, UBMC filed an additional motion for summary judgment 
based upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision. Having evaluated the evidence obtained 
through several years of discovery, which had closed, and having supplemented the 
record with such evidence, UBMC contended that the undisputed material facts required 
the trial court to hold that the duration of the Agreement was unreasonable and the 
Agreement unenforceable. The trial court agreed and granted UBMC's motion. 
Dr. Hardy now asks this Court for yet another bite at the apple. He claims that the 
trial court failed to consider and construe in his favor certain record evidence, failed to 
permit additional discovery and otherwise failed to comply with the Utah Supreme 
Court's mandate. Stated differently, Dr. Hardy is essentially asking the Court to start this 
case over from scratch. Dissatisfied with the results of the case to date, Dr. Hardy now 
seeks permission to fundamentally change his theory of the case by submitting a 
contrived, post-hoc declaration prepared after the decision in UBMC I. Dr. Hardy also 
3 
seeks to reopen discovery despite having taken extensive discovery over a period of six 
years, having received every medical provider contract that UBMC had in its possession, 
and having previously certified the case as ready for trial. For the reasons discussed 
herein, UBMC respectfully asks the Court to affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in its favor. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On October 29, 1996, under the threat of litigation by Dr. Hardy, UBMC filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne 
County. R. at 4. UBMC sought a declaration from the court that it was within its rights 
in terminating the Agreement with Dr. Hardy. Id. Dr. Hardy asserted counterclaims 
against UBMC for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.1 Id. at 22. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment approximately eighteen 
months after the institution of the action. Id. at 170, 270. The trial court denied both 
motions on October 19, 1998. Id. at 411-12. Following nearly three additional years of 
litigation and extensive discovery, including the depositions of at least seventeen 
witnesses and the production of thousands of documents, each of the parties again moved 
for summary judgment, in part on the basis of a series of facts to which UBMC and 
Dr. Hardy also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Dr. Thomas Allred. R. at 
22. However, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Dr. Allred by granting his 
motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2000. R. at 1067-68. 
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Dr. Hardy had stipulated.2 Id. at 520, 526. Following a hearing on the renewed cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court, at the request of Dr. Hardy, reserved its 
summary judgment ruling pending additional briefing on the issue of whether the 
Agreement was impermissibly binding upon successor UBMC boards of trustees. Id. at 
1054. The trial court then granted UBMC's motion for summary judgment. Id. An 
Order memorializing the Court's ruling was entered on May 18, 2000. Id. at 1073. 
Dr. Hardy appealed on June 5, 2000. Id. at 1085. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court first addressed the general issue of whether 
successor governmental entities should be permitted to void certain contracts depending 
upon whether the contracts implicated the governmental entity's proprietary or 
governmental functions. UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, at ffl[ 8-12. The court elected to apply 
the traditional governmental/proprietary test, under which "a contract is (1) 
unenforceable against successor governing bodies if it involves a governmental power or 
function, but (2) enforceable against successor governing bodies if it involves a 
proprietary power or function and is of a reasonable duration." Id. at j^ 11 (emphasis 
added). The court then determined that the Agreement in this case involves UBMC's 
proprietary functions. Id. at f^ 17. As a result, the Agreement would be enforceable 
against successor boards of UBMC only "if its duration was reasonable at the time the 
parties executed the contract." Id. Because the court deemed the record inadequately 
The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts was first filed in the trial court on 
October 1, 1999. R. at 517. A copy of the stipulation is included in the Addendum 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
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developed on the issue of the reasonableness of the Agreement's duration, it remanded 
the case to the district court "to allow further development of the record and then to make 
this determination." Id. atf 18. 
Before the trial court on remand, UBMC moved for summary judgment based 
upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision. R. at 1259. Concurring with UBMC's 
analysis, the trial court granted UBMC's motion for summary judgment on June 12, 
2003. R. at 1622. The court held that, under the guidelines established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in UBMC /, the Agreement was unenforceable because it unduly limited 
the UBMC board's discretion and was therefore unreasonable in its duration. A final 
order of judgment was entered on July 15, 2003. Id. at 1629. Dr. Hardy timely appealed. 
Id. at 1635. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UBMC is a county hospital located in Roosevelt, Utah, which is owned and 
operated by Duchesne County. R. at 1271. According to Utah law, the ultimate 
responsibility for UBMC lies with the Duchesne County Commission, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-26-1, but UBMC's operations are governed by a Board of Trustees. Id. at 
1001-02; see also R. at 517. On behalf of UBMC, the Board of Trustees entered into the 
Agreement with Dr. Hardy on or about December 12, 1994. Id. at 1397. Despite the 
date on which the Agreement was signed, the parties agreed that its effective date was 
August 1, 1994. Id. at 1396. Pursuant to the Agreement, Dr. Hardy was to supply 
3
 A copy of the Agreement is included as Exhibit A in the Addendum to Dr. 
Hardy's Brief. 
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pathology services to IIBIXIC on a part-time, mostly off-site basis. Id In fact, the 
Agreement required l)i llanl\ U\ < i .ii lln- I IBM( ' LH \h\\ |iisl onee i week fui niit I fun 
hours per visit Id. at 1397. 
The Agreement does not specify how long it was to remain in effect. Instead, the 
Agreement reeiles fliiif ii unteels (he \uvi\u of |l IMM( "( itt this ft/ifr ^ ami ()i'o\ ides as 
follows: "This Agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind 
the parties to the terms until terminated after ninety days written notice for just cause of 
tei i ninatioi ii/b;; eiti I ii pai h : \ I: ) i i n iti ml coi lsei it of the pai ties :. - .-.liorter notice period." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
UBMC's Board of Trustees terminated the Agreement approximately \ \\ i- \t .* 
!o !«v, ^ v . " if , ' :.jKi...: i.ij Ov.;. isiwii, \ iv^v s h^am lieio ai least 
two discussions relating to the Agreement anc'*h* • • e.' .•! * i - -
regularly scheduled board meetings. See R at 182-83; 171 180/ Although the minutes 
*;] njse meetings suggest that the Board generally appreciated Dr. Hardyfs services, 
members of the hospital's adimrnslhitiiMi had expiessetl eoneerin ilioiniii I h l l a n h V 
limited availability and a desire for a full-time pathologist. Id. at 333. In fact, during his 
tenure \. uis t,t , • i 11.. *^" Price, generally came to the UBMC facility 
0111 • • • . - : 'A • » . - , . , ^ , , j ) t T 
month. M at 12 71. In light of these circumstances, the Board ultimately determined that 
the health, welfare, and interests of the citizens of Duchesne County would be better 
Copies of the meeting minutes dated Ju : 990, and July i 8, 1990, aie 
included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibits B ano ( \ respectively. 
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served by a pathologist who could provide more comprehensive services, including 
working at the facility on a full-time basis, living in Roosevelt and assisting in providing 
much needed emergency medicine services. R. at 177; Exhibit C at 4. The Board 
therefore voted to provide Dr. Hardy with ninety days notice that the Agreement would 
be terminated. Id. 
On July 29, 1996, Bradley D. LeBaron, the Hospital Administrator of UBMC and 
an ex officio member of the Board, sent a letter to Dr. Hardy informing him that the 
Agreement was terminated effective ninety days from the date of the letter. See R. at 10.5 
Dr. Hardy continued performing services for UBMC until October 28, 1996, 
approximately ninety days after the date of Mr. LeBaronfs letter. R. at 515. This action 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's order granting summary judgment to UBMC should be affirmed. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy, there were no genuine disputes of 
material fact presented to the trial court to preclude summary judgment. In accordance 
with the Utah Supreme Court's mandate in UBMC I, the trial court examined the 
additional record evidence submitted to it in connection with UBMC's Post-Remand 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Based upon this review, the trial court correctly 
determined that the uncontroverted record evidence supported just one conclusion—that 
the "just cause" clause substantially limited the discretion of the UBMC Board of 
5
 A copy of Mr. LeBaronfs letter is included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 
D. 
8 
Tiuslees it) its abililv lo leiiniiiak1 I lie Agreement, rendering the duration of the 
Agreement potentially perpetual and therefore unreasonable as a n inner * •. =' l.r- -r. 
The trial court's examination of the evidence regarding additional contracts 
betweei 11 JBMC and cither medical professionals was also correct and. comported with 
UBMCI. As the bum Surn^., -v.r : <• •.'..» = . - * i.> • -1 ii - .-s 
submitted to it6 and concluded that the clear majority contained either a specific duration 
or a provision allowing termination by either party without cause. When compared to 
these contracts. Di , I lardy5s :oi lti act ai id tl le tw o oldei • :oi iti acts sii i iilai tc • 1 lis ^ vei e 
clearly in the minority and therefore atypical of UBMC's practices.7 The trial court's 
conclusion on this point provided further support for its determination that Dr. Hardy's 
Aj'avi -.' - ionable I rollo ». < ' in: ig tl le Si lprei ne Coi it t5s i i landate,' '""if tl ie district 
court determines that the contract ' s duration is unreasonable , the court should not enforce 
the con t rac t : ' UBMC I, 2002 U T 92, ]f 19 
I*i ll.'ii'iJ ""s revjucsl liii iidciilioniil iJ i i .anei) IIUJ.-J it I so be rejected, i iu Supreme 
Court did not order the re-opening of discovery as Dr. Hardy would have this ( Ourt 
bel ieve. In fact, Dr. Ha rdy ' s actions demonstrate that he did not bel ieve more discovery 
•• \<^>.ii \ • :inrv iudqment issues, as evidenced by his f ailin e to f ile a R i ile 
Contrary to Dr. H a r d y ' s assertion that U B M C did not p roduce all of its 
contracts wi th medical professionals, U B M C provided all such contracts within its 
possession, custody or control to Dr. Hardy through discovery in 1999. R. at 1592. 
One oi the \w .• -..Mu contracts was that o! Dr. H a r d y ' s predecessor , whose 
contract Dr. Hardy modified and submitted to U B M C when he took over as U B M C ' s 
contract pathologist , R at 1546, p . 2. 
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56(f) motion and affidavit requesting additional discovery prior to determination of the 
summary judgment motion. Moreover, Dr. Hardy failed to preserve this issue for appeal 
because he did not comply with Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and not 
once during the entire course of this litigation did he file a motion to compel discovery. 
The only additional discovery to which Dr. Hardy specifically refers is his belief that 
UBMC has not produced all of its agreements with medical professionals and his desire 
to question Dr. Wayne Stewart about his agreement with UBMC. However, UBMC 
produced all of the contracts within its possession, custody or control to Dr. Hardy in 
1999. Id. at 1292. Further, although UBMC and Dr. Hardy were having ongoing 
discussions about allowing Dr. Hardy to propound some follow-up questions to Dr. 
Stewart regarding his contract prior to trial, Dr. Hardy apparently did not deem the 
questioning to be necessary prior to the trial court's summary judgment ruling, and he did 
not file a Rule 56(f) motion. Under these circumstances, the trial court's decision not to 
reopen discovery should be affirmed. 
Finally, the trial court's determination that the Agreement was unenforceable 
made it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate 
the Agreement. The issue is therefore not properly before this Court, and Dr. Hardy's 
gratuitous submission of numerous irrelevant "facts" on this issue is wholly 
inappropriate. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT NO GENUINE 
DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AND THAT THE CONTRACT 
IS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
I k Uunl) ^tvks i n n s i t l (in l(n «"ii iinnik lliiil ll i lll.il i null ill ipl op* 11«, l.iilnl to 
construe the facts before it in a light most favorable to him and that disputed facts should 
have prevented the entry of summary judgment against him As part and parcel of this 
omlnili, -ll ! "i 11.1111\ tiigut11, (li, 11 \\w I Mill - Mini ur\ .itl'i »l llu1 pins niu ol the ••. *-v 
weighing the credibility of the evidence. Because the trial court properly coiibiiucc 
evidence in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy and complied with the Utah Supreme 
i nil1!- Rhine I J I1'",. Iinni UBAh ' J "11 'Ining so, Ui. Ilnrdy's arguments should be rejected. 
A. Dr. Hardy's Reading of the Utah Supreme Cour t ' s Mandate Is 
Inaccurate and Mischaracterizes Utah Summary Judgment Law, 
: !v repeatedly accuses the trial court m misconstruing, misinterpreting and 
failing * < e^m< 1 - \ i i h t i i c l - ' ^ : ^ • . • ••• n is ii \ L TB A f C I Set ; -" f 
of Appellant (hereinafter, "Appellant's Br.") at 18, 23, 39-40. A close reading ol ihw 
opinioi I it i I IB M'C I , however, reveals tl lat it is Dr. Hardy who has misinterpreted the 
Supreme Coui !:' s opii ii :):i I as well as tl le stai idards govei i ring i i lotions foi si u i in. mi y 
judgment. 
As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court concluded in UBMCI that the 
A^ivir -i • ,. . , • . • ., t . . • i . , .ition 
was reasonable at the time the parties executed the contract." UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, 
117 To make that determination, the Supreme Court instructed to trial court to examine 
11 
the following two factors: (1) the amount of discretion provided to the UBMC Board 
under the "just cause" provision and (2) a comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to those 
typically entered into by UBMC with medical professionals. Id. at 1 18. According to 
the Supreme Court, if the "just cause" provision was intended to grant broad discretion to 
the UBMC board in terminating the Agreement, "the contract is more likely to be of a 
reasonable duration than if the 'just cause5 provision permitted termination only for 
deficient job performance." Id. With respect to the comparison of other UBMC 
contracts to Dr. Hardy's, the court suggested that "[t]he extent to which the durational 
limitations in Dr. Hardy's contract conform to UBMC's usual practices in similar 
situations may factor into the district court's reasonableness assessment." Id. If the 
district court determined based upon this analysis that the contract's duration is 
unreasonable, the contract would be unenforceable and the case would be over. Id. at f^ 
19. However, if the court determined that the duration of the contract is reasonable, the 
question would become whether the UBMC board acted within its discretion in 
terminating the Agreement, id., which the undisputed evidence shows that it did. Only in 
this latter circumstance would the trial court be required to reach the issue of "whether 
the UBMC board had 'just case' to terminate Dr. Hardy." Id. 
Dr. Hardy claims that the trial court's job was "to survey the entire evidentiary 
landscape . . . and decide whether a reasonable person could somehow interpret the facts 
as advanced by Dr. Hardy were reasonable in any plausible way" Appellant's Br. at 18 
(emphasis added). However, the trial court clearly had a duty on remand to comport with 
the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court. Phebus, 198 P.2d at 974 (stating that the 
12 
issues decided upoi i b> the Utah Supreme Court on appeal "may not be acted upon or 
decided contrary to llu' \vn\ l lw ^ nv deoidrd h> Ihr MHIII1 I I'nntun In I ii Muni*, s 
wishful thinking, it is not the duty of the trial court to scour the record for evidence in 
support m . • Hardy's position, nor was the trial court required to determine whether 
there v i • >iM<'v*u\ teasotublt tun IHH in MI|>|K»II I h Hanly'scase Instead, 
once UBMC moved for summary judgment, it became Dr. Hardy's burden to - < i 
with sufficient admissible and specific evidence to create a genuine issue of fact for ^;, 
Siv ( H.ih R ( 'i I1 Sli(c»; Peterson \ < m a (\>lu I >\SA, J00/ I 1 I 42, JO, 4S i , * 
This he failed to do. 
B. Dr. Hardy Offered No Admissible Evidence Sufficient to Create a 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact on the Reasonableness of the 
Agreement's Duration. 
With respect to the "just cause" provision, the trial court correctly held that the 
evidence in the record was undisputed and strongly supported the conclusion that the 
Agreen ienfs di iratioi 1 was i n lreasoi lable due to the exti ei nely lin lited amount of 
discretion afforded to the UBMC board. This evidence consisted prirnaril i I 
Dr Hardy's explicit and unequivocal admissions in his deposition that he believed the 
Board I mi I little MI IM> discretion w illi lespccl to the circumstances in whKh the 
Agreement could be terminated. This testimony provides: 
Q. In your opinion, then, so long as both sides are performing the 
provisions of the agreement, is it your belief that this contract, then, 
would exist perpetually? 
A. What does perpetually mean? 
Q. Forever. 
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A. Yes. I wouldn't have said it and I wouldn't have signed it if I didn't 
believe it. 
R. at 1391. In response to a question from his own counsel, Dr. Hardy further testified as 
follows: 
Q. Now, if I give you a definition which is obtained from Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary which says perpetual means without end, is 
your contract or was your contract with UBMC without end? 
A. No. 
Q. What would bring that contract to an end? 
A. If I died or if I went blind or if I fell into a coma. 
R. at 1389. The trial court correctly concluded based upon this undisputed evidence that 
"the contract offered little discretion to successor boards." Id. at 1625. 
Dr. Hardy came forth with only one additional piece of "evidence" to rebut his 
own testimony—a self-serving declaration drafted after the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion in UBMC I in which he attempted to dramatically alter his deposition testimony. 
Id. at 1546. Noting that the declaration was prepared after the Supreme Court's decision 
"to more similarly mirror the higher Court's opinion," id. at 1625, the trial court correctly 
refused to consider Dr. Hardy's declaration. The law in Utah is clear that "when a party 
takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may 
not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, 
unless he can provide an explanation of the discrepancy.... A contrary rule would 
undermine the utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of 
fact." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted); see also 
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Harnicherv. I University of t u,n \ku • 7/% 962 P ?d rn. n\ fTT!;ih 1008V Ltr.n** 
Overland Thrift S /,oa//1 SIS 1* M Ml(» i LL! (t Vifi «i i Ap|i I'");;). 
Dr. Hardy attempts to characterize his declaration as a mere "expansion" of his 
deposition testimony, claiming that the principle set forth in Webster applies only in cases 
involving w dmvl emilias! helween pi mi I* Jtmoio. ,ni>l J subsequent affidavit I lowever, 
a comparison o f D i . Hardy's declaration to his deposition testimony reveals tl le absi u dity 
of the claim that his statements are consistent In his deposition, including the portions 
cited above as \ \" | | as those adiiehnl li> Ins appellate t-.^i. i;. ..ardy repeatedly asserts 
that only certain dire circumstances would justify - • 
of the Agreement; R. at 1392 ("That means that the terms of the contract aren't being 
It means] | -a .natever terms I don't meet."); (2) a threat 
presented to the welfare of the palimts nr (lie 1:0111111111111 • -i\( cause) \\ otiM he 
to the detriment of the patients, the community, the physicians that I serve."); and (3) 
l)i I lardy s own deati. - 0 ^ »• - . i ; , *</ A 1389 ("If I died or if I went blind or if I fell 
into a coma."") ^ • 1 *spLnn«a«I in I iMM( * s Memorandum in Suppoil ol its Cost Kemand 
Motion for Summary Judgment, this deposition testimony was consistent with the st.r • • *• 
Dr. tardy took during the entire course of this litigation up through the Supreme t o u s 
decision m I li\ti " L 
By contrast, in his declaration, Dr. Hardy now claims that "just 1 ; I I IM" tiu\ iiNu 
include such biuui economic factors as closing the hospital or materially changing the 
"*•'
 i
 : . - j ; services were not neeov..; j xlnbii i ' ir 
Appellee's Br. ^1 -J. Dr. Hard\ eoes on to state tiia *-> - •*:• '•" C 
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could terminate the Agreement, for example, if "UBMC no longer performed surgery or 
other medical procedures that require pathology services." Id. Under Webster and its 
progeny, Dr. Hardy's attempt to so drastically alter his testimony to create an issue of fact 
simply cannot be sanctioned. Indeed, the very purpose of the doctrine laid out in Webster 
is to distinguish "between discrepancies which create transparent shams and 
discrepancies which create an issue of credibility." Tippins v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 
949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). The trial court's determination that the discrepancies created 
by Dr. Hardy's declaration fall into the former category and the court's resulting decision 
not to consider the declaration were unquestionably proper. 
Even if the court had considered Dr. Hardy's declaration, however, it was clearly 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. "To overcome summary judgment, 
plaintiffs must offer at least some evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the 
elements of the claim." Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, f 35, 54 
P.3d 1054. Dr. Hardy has failed to meet this burden because the "evidence" he presents 
fails to support his new claim that the board had broad discretion to terminate the 
Agreement. Although Dr. Hardy attempts in his declaration to expand his view of the 
circumstances constituting "just cause," Dr. Hardy still substantially constricts the 
UBMC board's discretion. According to Dr. Hardy, termination would be appropriate 
only if the nature of the hospital changed so materially that pathology services were no 
longer needed or if UBMC had financial concerns "of such magnitude that the policy-
making function of the Duchesne County Commissioners would be involved (e.g., 
hospital closure)." R. at 1546, p. 4. Dr. Hardy even goes so far as to state that "while 
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IIBM.C had any need for pathology services, UBMC contractually agreed that I was the 
medical doctor to perform tt lose services ' ' « i Giv ei 1 tl lat e^  ' ei i. Di I lard}' 's it i z < vly-
minted declaration describes the board's discretion as strictly confined to certain limited 
circumstances, tin \\\w\ court was correct in concluding that the declaration was 
inadeqi late to gei lei ate ai \y gei n line issi ic of i natei ial fa ::t 
In a novel approach to legal argument, Dr. Hardy now argues that his views at the 
time he entered into the contract are irrelevant to the interpretation of the "just cause" 
provisioi 1 . • : . . . . , < , . ; .. I^MMIM-; , . ;iaiw. 
again seeks to distance himself from the views expressed at his deposition and throughout 
the course of this litigation. Nonetheless, the testimony remains in the record and 
Dr I lai cly 1 las coi i ic f 01 tl i i • < a i l i notl lii ig to dispute it Therefore, even read in the ligl it 
most favorable to Dr. 1 lai dy , the testimony as well as Di ! Tardy's inadi nissibl- i 
declaration unequivocally express Dr. Hardy's view of the extremely limited discretion of 
1 - ) terminate the Agreement. 
Dr. Hardy's contentioi I that tl ic trial :oi it t failed to consider exti insic e\ idence in 
interpreting the Agreement is also unavailing. While Dr. Hardy is correct that the 
admission of parol LA kicnce to interpret the terms of an ambiguous agreement can 
conform the agreemei it's ii itei pretatioi i ii itc a qi lestioi l of fact foi tl le ji u y, Petei 'son v. 
Sunrider Corp., 2002 IJT 43, }\ 14, 48 P.3d 918 (citation omitted), summary judgment is 
still appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See generally id. 
(< p •til ig Faulkm 7 v E it n swc >/ th, 665 P 2* 1 1292, 1293 (I Jtah 19830); see also View 
Condominium Owners, 2004 UT App 104, % 29 (affirming trial coi irt's grant of si ran 1 iai y 
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judgment where court "correctly examined the extrinsic evidence" and concluded that 
"the evidence uniformly and irrebutably supported]" one party's interpretation of 
agreement). The trial court's summary judgment should be affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Conducted a Comparison of Dr. Hardy's 
Agreement to Agreements Typically Entered Into by UBMC with 
Medical Professionals. 
The trial court also correctly determined that the second component of the 
Supreme Court's mandate, i.e., the comparison of Dr. Hardy's agreement to other 
"agreements UBMC typically enters into with medical professionals/' UBMC I, 2002 UT 
92, \ 18, supported the conclusion that the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract was 
unreasonable. Dr. Hardy vehemently contends that the trial court erred in this analysis by 
failing to consider two contracts in particular - that of Dr. Joseph J. Sannella, which 
contained the same "just cause" language as Dr. Hardy's, and that of Dr. Wayne Stewart,9 
which limited the circumstances in which the agreement could be terminated to the 
mutual consent of the parties or Dr. Stewart's loss of his license or conviction of a felony. 
Exhibit G to Appellee's Br. at 3. 
Dr. Hardy's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Dr. Hardy's claim that 
the trial court ignored Dr. Sannella's and Dr. Hardy's contracts is inaccurate. The trial 
court expressly referred to Dr. Stewart's contract in its summary judgment ruling, R. at 
8
 Dr. Sannella's contract is included in the Addendum to Dr. Hardy's Brief as 
Exhibit F. 
9
 Dr. Stewart's contract is included in the Addendum to Dr. Hardy's Brief as 
Exhibit F. 
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1621, and both Dr. Stewart's and Dr. Sannella's contract were raised and discussed at 
oral argument, id. at 1649, pp. 12-13, 26-27, and raised by the parties in their summary 
judgment memoranda. Id. at 1415, 578-80, 1585. The contracts were also attached as 
exhibits to the parties' summary judgment memoranda. Id. at 1266 (Dr. Sanella's 
contract); id. at 1539 (Dr. Stewart's contract). 
Second, the manner in which Dr. Hardy claims the trial court should have 
considered the two contracts misconstrues the Supreme Court's mandate. What the 
Supreme Court instructed the trial court to do was compare the durational limitations of 
Dr. Hardy's Agreement to those of "agreements UBMC typically enters into with medical 
professionals." UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, at \ 18 (emphasis added). The trial court followed 
this instruction precisely. After examining the thirteen agreements attached to UBMC's 
summary judgment memorandum, R. at 1274-1372, the trial court correctly determined 
that Dr. Hardy's Agreement was not typical of the contracts UBMC generally employs 
with medical professionals. Id. at 1621. Instead of viewing Dr. Sannella's and Dr. 
Stewart's contracts as typical or representative of UBMC's practices, as Dr. Hardy would 
have it, the court correctly determined that the majority of the contracts presented to it 
represented UBMC's typical practices, and that Dr. Hardy's, Dr. Sannella's and Dr. 
Stewart's were atypical of those practices. Indeed, unlike Dr. Hardy's Agreement, the 
clear majority of UBMC's agreements with medical professionals contained either a 
provision allowing termination without cause by either party or a specific time limitation. 
See generally id. at 1274-1372. This record evidence is undisputed. 
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The trial court was also correct in rejecting Dr. Hardy's argument that his 
agreement was typical of UBMC's agreements with "hospital-based" physicians, which 
he raises again on appeal. This argument simply is not borne out by the evidence. As 
stated by the trial court, "[comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to other similarly situated 
hospital-based physicians, such as surgeons, shows that his contract was still unusual in 
not providing a specific time limitation on the contract and the provision allowing either 
party to terminate [without cause] given the appropriate notice period." Id. at 1621 
(emphasis added). 
The only additional record evidence Dr. Hardy claims supports his interpretation 
of the contract is a provision in UBMC's Bylaws to which the Supreme Court referred in 
its opinion. The UBMCI citation to which Dr. Hardy refers provides: "For example, 
UBMC's bylaws concerning its medical staff suggest that UBMC routinely enters into 
agreements under which the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed "just 
cause" provision." UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, at 118. However, this provision of the 
Bylaws specifically governs UBMC's procedures for granting hospital privileges to 
medical professionals; it is not applicable to contracting for services or employment with 
such professionals. In addition, the Supreme Court did not in making this statement hold 
that UBMC's actual practice is to enter into such contracts. In fact, the actual evidence 
on the subject, i.e., the contracts themselves, unequivocally supports the opposite 
conclusion: UBMC's practice was to limit the duration of its agreements or to provide 
both parties with the right to terminate for any reason upon proper notice. 
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In summary, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to UBMC on the basis of 
its conclusion that the Agreement was unenforceable should be affirmed. 
II. DR. HARDY DID NOT PROPERLY SEEK ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IN 
THE TRIAL COURT AND NO ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY WAS 
REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT. 
A. Dr. Hardy Failed to Preserve the Issue of His Request to Reopen 
Discovery for Appeal. 
Dr. Hardy claims that the trial court should have permitted additional discovery in 
this case on remand before entering summary judgment. The first and most significant 
problem with this argument is that it is not properly before this Court. Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that, if a party fails to comply with Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in seeking additional discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment, the 
party has failed to preserve the issue for appeal.10 For example, in Grynberg, 2003 UT 1, 
Tf 57, the Utah Supreme Court declined to address the appellants' argument that summary 
judgment should be reversed to allow additional discovery because they "failed to move 
the court for a continuance or to file an affidavit pursuant to [R]ule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." This Court should follow suit. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1198 
(Utah 1987) (refusing to address argument requesting additional discovery where 
plaintiffs failed to submit a Rule 56(f) affidavit to the trial court); View Condominium 
Although Dr. Hardy filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order to Permit 
Limited Discovery for purposes of videotaping the cross-examination of Dr. Thomas 
Allred, R. at 1157-58, Dr. Hardy has not filed a single motion to compel discovery 
throughout the eight-year course of this litigation. 
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Owners, 2004 UT App 104, at \ 37 ("As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider 
an issue . . . raised for the first time on appeal."). 
B. Even if the Issue Were Properly Before the Court, the Trial Court 
Acted Well Within its Discretion in Denying Dr. Hardy's Request to 
Reopen Discovery. 
According to Dr. Hardy, the portion of the Utah Supreme Court's mandate in 
UBMC I instructing "further development of the record" on the issue of the 
reasonableness of the contract's duration, UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, f 18, required discovery 
to be reopened. What Dr. Hardy fails to recognize, however, is that supplementing or 
developing the record is not and need not be the equivalent of taking additional 
discovery, particularly in a case in which discovery was completed over four years ago, 
R. at 651, and in which Dr. Hardy previously (in 1999) certified his readiness for trial. 
Id. at 492. Instead, developing the record in accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's 
instruction simply required submitting additional evidence gained through discovery to 
the trial court, which is exactly what occurred in this case.11 
The only discovery Dr. Hardy specifically identifies is additional physician 
contracts from UBMC and additional deposition testimony from Dr. Stewart. Dr. Hardy 
is grasping at straws. Not only has UBMC already produced every contract in its 
possession, custody or control, id. at 1292, but Dr. Hardy took Dr. Stewart's deposition 
on a prior occasion and has Dr. Stewart's contract in his possession. Additionally, even 
11
 Among the evidence presented to the trial court with UBMC's motion for 
summary judgment were thirteen agreements with medical professionals as well as 
deposition testimony not previously reviewed by the court. 
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though UBMC was not opposed to permitting limited additional questioning of Dr. 
Stewart prior to trial, if the case went to trial, Dr. Hardy did not even attempt to re-depose 
Dr. Stewart before the summary judgment hearing, did not file a Rule 56(f) motion and 
generally did not oppose or attempt to prevent the trial court from ruling on UBMC's 
motion. Under these circumstances, there is no additional discovery to be had and no 
reasonable basis for asserting that additional discovery would advance Dr. Hardy's case. 
Dr. Hardy's argument must therefore be rejected. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 
P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (upholding trial court's denial of Rule 56(f) motion where 
party failed to adequately explain how additional discovery would advance the party's 
case and made only "a conclusory claim of need for further discovery"). 
Responding to a similar post-summary judgment motion request to reopen 
discovery, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has stated: 
The Supreme Court, in Anderson and Celotex, has strongly affirmed the 
viability of summary judgment as an effective tool for disposing of 
meritless claims. . . . If this Court were to approve this plaintiffs request to 
reopen discovery and, in effect, to have a second attempt, through a new 
lawyer, to muster evidence in support of a dubious claim, it would undercut 
the rationale of Anderson and Celotex, and would set an intolerable 
precedent. A plaintiff who became dissatisfied with the performance of his 
attorney in presenting evidence at the summary judgment stage or at trial 
could seek to reopen discovery or to have another trial, with new counsel, 
eternally hoping, as did Wilkins Micawber in David Copperfield, that 
"something will turn up." 
Sturdivant v. MedicalEng'g Corp., 121 F.R.D. 51, 52 (D. Md. 1988) (refusing to grant 
request for additional discovery and granting summary judgment for defendant). 
Although Dr. Hardy's claim is not dependent upon his retention of new counsel but 
instead upon his dissatisfaction with the results of this litigation to date, the same 
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principle applies. Dr. Hardy should not be permitted to start over an eight-year-old case 
at this late date. 
In the context of seeking to reopen discovery, Dr. Hardy also makes the 
outrageous observation that he "may wish" to retain an additional expert witness. The 
initial Scheduling Order in this case was entered over five years ago, on April 5, 1999. 
R. at 425. The Scheduling Order required identification of the parties' expert witnesses 
by June 1, 1999, and submission of any written expert reports by July 1, 1999. Id. at 424. 
Although the Scheduling Order was later amended, id. at 652, the amendment did not 
alter the deadlines related to expert witnesses or reports. Id. at 651. Thus, in accordance 
with the original Scheduling Order, Dr. Hardy designated two expert witnesses on June 1, 
1999, id. at 431, and UBMC designated an expert witness on July 27, 1999. Id. at 473. 
Moreover, Dr. Hardy certified his readiness for trial in the fall of 1999, as stated above. 
R. at 491-92. Permitting Dr. Hardy to designate an additional expert witness at this late 
stage of the litigation truly would amount to starting the case over from scratch. 
in . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REACH THE "JUST CAUSE" ISSUE, 
NOR SHOULD THIS COURT. 
Dr. Hardy's final argument is that factual disputes on the issue of whether UBMC 
had "just cause" to terminate the Agreement should have precluded summary judgment. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in UBMC I, however, the issue of whether UBMC 
acted with "just cause" in terminating the agreement would only need to be addressed if 
the trial court concluded that the Agreement was enforceable. UBMC I, 2002 UT 92, 
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Tf 19. Because it determined otherwise, the trial court correctly declined to reach the 
issue. As such, the issue is not before this Court. 
In light of the trial court's decision not to reach the question of "just cause," Dr. 
Hardy's lengthy recitation of "facts" in support of his position is gratuitous and improper. 
UBMC respectfully asks the Court to disregard this irrelevant and inflammatory material. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, UBMC asks the Court to affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and entry of the final judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fa day of April, 2004. 
^OCME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Blaine J. Benard 
E. Blaine Rawson 
Christine T. Greenwood 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Uintah 
Basin Medical Center 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 2004, I caused to be mailed, by 
United States first-class mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to the following: 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
JLU-
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ADDENDUM 
A. Joint Stipulation of Facts (October 1, 1999) 
B. Medical Staff Meeting Minutes (July 11,1996) 
C. Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes (July 18, 1996) 
D. Letter from Bradley D. LeBaron (July 29, 1996) 
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Exhibit A 
JOHN P. HARRINGTON (A5242) 
JONI J. JONES (A7562) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, 
v. : Civil No. 990000109CV 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
Defendant. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Counterclaimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER and 
THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D., 
Counterclaim Defendant 
and Third-Party 
Defendant. 
—ooOoo— 
Defendamt and Third-Party Plaintiff Leo W. Hardy, MD. ("Dr. Hardy"), and Plaintiff 
Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"), stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified Pathologist. 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital which is owned by 
Duchesne County and operated by its own Board of Trustees. 
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into a contract ("the 
Agreement") in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for UBMC as director of 
the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform related duties. (A copy of the Agreement is 
attached as Exhibit "A"). The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract between 
UBMC and Dr. Sannella (a pathologist at UBMC that immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). 
Dr. Hardy modified the contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The 
Agreement was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by Bradley D. 
LeBaron ("Mr. LeBaron"), who was UBMC's administrator and had authority to enter into 
personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind 
the parties to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days 
written notice for just cause of termination by either party or by mutual 
consent of the parties to a shorter notice period. 
5. The UBMC Board of Trustees ("the Board") is the entity authorized to terminate 
personal services contract. 
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6. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and to invite 
Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an 
emergency room physician. 
7. On July 22, 1996, Dr. Hardy encountered Dr. Allred at UBMC. The two 
physicians engaged in a verbal exchange. 
8. On July 26, 1996, Mr. LeBaron telephoned Dr. Hardy to discuss UBMC's decision 
to terminate the Agreement. In a letter dated July 29, 1996, Mr. LeBaron informed Dr. Hardy 
that UBMC was terminating the Agreement. The letter, in its entirety, stated: 
As a followup to our telephone conference of July 26, 1996 and pursuant 
to the terms of our agreement dated November 29, 1994 item #11 which 
allows for a 90-day termination period, I am hereby giving you notice of 
termination of our contract effective October 29, 1996. 
This same section of our contract allows for a shorter length of termination 
by mutual consent. In our phone conversation, you agreed to work out the 
90-day termination period. 
On behalf of our Board, Medical Staff, and patients, I offer our sincere 
appreciation for your services to our hospital and patients. 
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, approximately 
90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the Agreement. 
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations under the Agreement 
satisfactorily and received no complaints from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of 
the Agreement, on a few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and 
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed limited pathology services 
for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. Alfred's absence. 
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11. In its Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Hardy's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, UBMC asserted that Dr. Hardy's conduct during the July 22, 1996 encounter with 
Dr. Allred constituted additional just cause for its decision to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract. The 
decision to tenninate was made on July 18, 1996. The Notice of Termination was given to 
Dr. Hardy verbally on July 26, 1996 and in writing on July 29, 1996. 
ft 
DATED this QY^ay of September, 1999. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
^4/ £ //^ 
John P. Harrington * 
Joni J. Jones 
Attorneys for Leo W. Hardy M.D. 
DATED this 7J\ day of September, 1999. 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
line J. Benard 
Jenniffer Nelson Byde 
Attorneys for UBMC 
495532/jph 
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EXHIBIT A 
November 29. 1994 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
P.O. Box 795 
Price. UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling our 
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following: 
1. Dr. Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basin Medical Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2. Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews. 
b. Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c. Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative problems 
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered that 
week's laboratory visit. 
3. Will be available to the Medical Staff for help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult, 
4* Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or fine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
5. Will undertake teaching activities for both Medical Staff and Laboratory Staff when 
new procedures are to be introduced. 
Leo W. Hardy, MJD. 
November 29, 1994 
Page 2 of 2 
6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7« Will take responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities CJLiA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8- Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of 
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory. 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400.00 per 
month, 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken* These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shail become effective August l f 1994 and continue co bind the parties 
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D. TLeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
Leo W. B&ufty, M D . 
Exhibit B 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
MEDICAL STAFF MEETING 
July 11, 1996 
CALL TO ORDER: Dr. Rex Ripplinger 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Dr. Brilliant, Dr. Wayne Stewart, Dr. Teresa Stewart, Dr. Buxton, Dr. 
Evans, Dr. Mark Mitchell, Dr. Morrill, Dr. Leo Hardy, Brad LeBaron, 
Geri Nielson 
MEMBERS EXCUSED: Dr. Hal Mitchell, mM$tft, Dr. Karlsson, Callie Pena 
MINUTES: The minutes of June 1996 were approved. 
OLD BUSINESS: Medicare is making strong statements about reimbursement for unnecessary labs. 
Dr. Hardy recommended that physicians be more objective in ordering labs because there is a cost 
incentive in ordering individual tests. Dr. Hardy and Joe Hokett are working together to develop organ 
specific panels and will be working on doctor specific panels as well. Dr. Hardy also indicated that each 
physician would be receiving a copy of a report on blood transfusion risks. If there are any questions, 
he would be happy to discuss them with staff members. 
Dr. Hardy demonstrated new electronic technology which would allow staff members to access the lab 
at Castle view Hospital for current lab results without having to speak directly with the pathologist. Each 
physician would need access to a modem which Dr. Hardy has considered providing for physician 
offices. Dr. Hardy also discussed a Tl line which would allow video conferencing. Several hospitals 
are now using the system and he hopes that our facility would consider investing in the system. This 
would make Dr. Hardy available at any time to report on frozen sections, etc. 
Brad reported that he had met with Ken Richins on a solution to get ER records to referring physicians. 
Ken indicated to Brad that Dr. Pehrson dictates who the referring physician is and Medical Records then 
sends that physician the needed records. This seems to be the best solution to the problem. However, 
Admitting will ask patients reporting to the ER for the name of their physician which will be placed on 
the face sheet. This may also alleviate some of the problem. 
NEW BUSINESS: 
Dr. Dolocourt: Dr. Teresa Stewart has made contact with Dr. Dolocourt, a pediatric neonatologist at 
>rimary Childrens Medical Center, who would like to bring CME conferences to our facility. He 
ecommends having a endocrinologist come here first to discuss diabetes. Dr. Dolocourt would also like 
o have us invite the physicians from AVMC to attend. Dr. Ripplinger suggested that Dr. Stewart and 
xeri Nielson work together to get a drug company to sponsor a dinner lecture. Mark Heslop of Lily 
fas suggested as a possibility. 
^assigned Admissions: Dr. Ripplinger asked for clarification of what constitutes an unassigned 
imission. It was his understanding that if a patient names a physician, that physician was to be called 
id not the physician on call for unassigned admissions. It is the consensus of the staff that Dr. 
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Ripplinger's understanding is correct. Also discussed was the fact that many times the physician on call 
leaves town without obtaining coverage for his shift. Dr. Buxton moved to fine the physician who does 
not find coverage $100 each time they miss their call time. Dr. Mark Mitchell made a second to the 
motion and the motion carried. 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT: 
Brad reported that utilization was down for the month but with the increase usage of outpatient services, 
we were able to stay in the black. 
The medical office building is scheduled for completion in mid September. The possibility of having 
a retail pharmacy in the building is being discussed. Also being discussed is a waiting area near the ER 
which will help the problem of visitors wanting to go into the ER. 
Brad reported that Dr. Thomas Allred, a physician dual-boarded in pathology and emergency medicine 
had come to us about relocating to this area. Dr. Hardy announced that his contract with Columbia has 
been extended to six years instead of the original two to three years. He said he is strongly committed 
to providing the best service he could to our facility including spending more time here. He explained 
that he is in the process of looking for an individuaj who would free up some of his time to allow greater 
coverage for us. Dr. Hardy expressed concern about another pathologist joining our staff. He stated it 
would be very expensive for the hospital to equip, supply and staff the lab for a full time pathologist. 
He also felt there was not enough work for a full time pathologist. Dr. Hardy then excused himself from 
the meeting. 
There was a lengthy discussion on the possibility of Dr. Allred joining the staff. Dr. Buxton felt that 
we needed to go beyond a CV to make sure the physician will fit in with the staff. Dr. Evans stated that 
having a physician in the community benefitted not just the hospital but the community as a whole. Dr. 
Stewart stated that he felt Dr. Hardy was doing a fine job but having a pathologist on staff would 
increase our pathology services. Brad also pointed out that we did need help in the ER and Dr. Allred 
is willing to supplement his income in that way. Drs. Ripplinger, Buxton and Mark Mitchell expressed 
heir support of Dr. Hardy. Dr. Allred will be invited back to the facility to give everyone a chance to 
neet him. Brad also stated that if any member of the staff wanted to make telephone inquiries regarding 
Dr. Allred, he would provide names and telephone numbers of his references. Dr. Buxton felt we did 
lot need a full time pathologist and that if we needed help in the ER, we should look at Dr. John 
vfasaryk who has expressed an interest in returning to the staff. Dr. Masaryk does not want to relocate 
o the area but would consider commuting from the Wasatch Front. Staff will be notified of Dr. 
Ulred's next visit. 
•feeting adjourned. 
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UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING 
MINUTES 
July 18, 1996 
Uintah Basin Medical Center Board Room 
Harry Fieldsted, Gordon Snow, Gayle Young, Dr. 
Wayne Stewart, Gail Hamilton, Curtis Dastrup, Smiley 
Arrowchis, Bradley D. LeBaron, Ray Hussey, 
Laurel Cranney, Marilynn Duncan 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Owen Van Tassell 
CALL TO ORDER: Harry Fieldsted, Chairman; 7:00 p.m. 
Minutes: 
The minutes of the June 1996 Board of Trustees Meeting were approved upon a 
motion by Gail Hamilton with a second by Gordon Snow. Voting was 
unanimous. 
Quality Assurance and Safety Report: 
Laurel Cranney gave the Quality Assurance and Safety Report. It was noted that 
deliveries for the first quarter of 1996 were 93 and 79 for the second quarter of 
1996. Total deaths were nine for the first quarter and 12 for the second. Deaths 
in the Emergency Room were two for the first quarter and eight for the second. 
There were 25 emergency patients in each quarter who were transferred to 
another acute care facility. There were 25 inpatients transferred for services not 
provided by the hospital in the first quarter and 32 in the second. Ongoing 
projects include the diabetic project and also the OB project. Home Health, OB, 
and ICU have ail made recent changes due to information collected for quality 
assurance. The Clinic has a plan in place and is collecting data. There were 30 
patient complaints regarding the Emergency Room in 1995, particularly dealing 
with the way patients feel they were treated. This area deserves looking into. 
There were a total of 69 complaints in 1995 wherein the hospital was contacted 
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with 3,000 discharged patients. The nursing staff is currently calling patients 
after their discharge to follow up and do further educating. A motion to accept 
the Quality Assurance and Safety Report was made by Gayle Young and was 
seconded by Gail Hamilton. Voting was unanimous. 
Building Cnnimiftee: 
Gordon Snow reported on the activities of the Building Committee and reviewed 
the building cost matrix. The anticipated date for completion of the new medical 
office building is still the middle of September. Very few subcontractors have 
been brought in from outside the Basin, and the Construction Supervisor has been 
quite pleased with the work of our local people. A shipment of windows were 
recently received and, upon the review of Chris Cooper, were determined to be 
below Cooper's standard. They were subsequently replaced with another 
window which had moldings to match the existing building. This was done at 
considerable expense to Coopers and demonstrated commendable integrity. 
The Board gave the Building Committee an assignment to review space for a 
Medical Staff library and to address the request made by Drs. Buxton and White 
to remain in their existing clinic rather than moving to the new medical office 
building. These items required a review of all existing space and yielded the 
following suggestions: 1) There are nine spaces in the new medical office 
building and we will utilize 7 lA with Dr. Teresa Stewart, Dr. Mark Mitchell, 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Drs. Morrill, Ripplinger, Smith, Brilliant, and visiting 
physicians. 2) The Obstetric Clinic (Evans building) will accommodate Dr. 
Evans and Callie Webb, leaving room for a new obstetrician as one is recruited. 
3) In the East Clinic (Buxton Building) will be Drs. Buxton and White, Bonnie 
Crozier and Administration. 4) In the Surgical Clinic (Indian Health) will be 
Orthopaedics, Pathology, General Surgery and the Medical Staff Library. 
It was noted that Cooper's bid includes all the millwork for the medical office 
building. 
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A motion to accept the Building Committee Report was made by Gail Hamilton, 
seconded by Smiley Arrowchis, and voting was unanimous. 
Human Resources: 
Dr. Wayne Stewart, Chairman of the Human Resources Committee, reported that 
Representative Beverly Evans recently met with the committee and understands 
the hospital's situation regarding our involvement in the State Retirement Fund. 
She indicated that in our efforts to opt off the plan, we should gain the support of 
the Board and the County Commission then obtain the understanding of the 
Governor. The Governor can give a strong recommendation to the Retirement 
Board. Representative Evans expressed her willingness to attend all the meetings 
we desire her to attend. The Board in the June Board Meeting voted to pursue 
whatever steps are necessary to opt off the State plan. A meeting is scheduled 
with the County Commission on July 30 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss this matter. An 
updated study from Peterson & Associates revealed the same trends as the initial 
study, demonstrating a need to choose another retirement program in order to 
maximize our benefits to both employees and the hospital. 
A motion was made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Wayne Stewart that the 
State be approached as outlined by Representative Evans and asked that we be 
allowed to opt off the State Retirement plan. Voting was unanimous. 
Beverly Evans suggested that Bob Linnell be invited here with representatives 
from the County Commission, the Board and Administration. Employees could 
be involved on the task force. This meeting could conceivably be held on the 
same day representatives from the Governor's office come to meet with the 
County. 
A motion was made by Curtis Dastrup and seconded by Smiley Arrowchis to 
accept the Human Resources Report as given. Voting was unanimous 
Chief nf Staff Report: 
In Dr. Hal Mitchell's absence, Dr.Wayne Stewart reported on Medical Staff 
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activity. Dr. Hardy and a pathologist who joined him came to Medical Staff 
Meeting regarding their proposal to put a pathologist in the Basin. Appreciation 
was expressed to Dr. Hardy for what he has done for our facility. This 
information is being considered in relationship to Dr. Thomas Allred joining our 
facility as a Pathologist/ER physician. The Medical Staff took no formal action 
regarding the matter. Dr. Allred has received highly complimentary references 
from those people called regarding his capabilities and character. Dr. Allred 
would be at the hospital full time and has asked that he be paid a clinical lab 
director's fee of $2,000 a month plus a percentage of billing. For the same type 
of service, Dr. Hardy works eight hours a month, and we pay him $400. Dr. 
Allred also desires, for the first year, to work four shifts per month in ER. The 
overall cost to us would be $2,000 a month and the costs involved in setting up 
an anatomical lab which would cost approximately $10,000 in capital expense. 
He will bring about $70,000 worth of equipment with him to install in our 
building. Dr. Allred is desirous of moving to Roosevelt and making his home 
here. 
A motion was made by Gordon Snow that we give Dr. Hardy 90-days notice as 
per his contract and offer Dr. Allred an invitation to join our facility. The 
motion was seconded by Gail Hamilton, and voting was unanimous. 
A motion to accept the Chief of Staff Report was made by Gayle Young with a 
second by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was unanimous. 
Financial Report: 
The Financial Report was made by Gayle Young and Ray Hussey. Inpatient 
Days, Admissions and Surgeries were down for the month. We also had fewer 
Births. Revenue was down and so were Operating Expenses. There was a 
combined loss for the Clinics of $17,000. We had a Net Gain for the month of 
June of $76,000. Ray Hussey indicated we are billing more quickly on accounts 
and after four months of nonpayment, turning the account to collections so we 
don't have an accumulation of long-standing, over-due billings. The current 
trend is almost two to one outpatient over inpatient services. It was reported that 
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due to not having a provider in the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, revenue 
there had dropped and $4,000 was lost for the month. There is a Year-to-Date 
Gain on the Clinics of $9,000. A motion to accept the Financial Report as given 
was made by Smiley Arrowchis, seconded by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was 
unanimous. 
Charity Care Policy: 
The Charity Care Policy had been distributed earlier to the Board for their 
review. It was pointed out that the Charity Care Policy is an opportunity to let 
people feel good about themselves rather than classifying their account as bad 
debt, if they meet the charity care criteria. A motion was made by Gordon Snow 
and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart to adopt the Charity Care Policy as 
outlined. Voting was unanimous. 
Hospice: 
There is a great deal of excitement regarding our hospice program which was 
recently granted licensure from the State. Jan Roberts is supervising this 
program, and we should have Medicare approval in approximately six weeks 
Durable Medical Equipment! 
Discussion was held regarding the possibility of purchasing equipment from 
Mountain Air Gas to buy tanks, equipment to fill our own oxygen tanks, and 
liquid oxygen equipment. We would be able to acquire an interest-free loan for 
three years with a 16-month pay off for equipment. We would realize a savings 
of $21,000 per year. There are currently ten patients on the liquid oxygen 
program. A motion was made by Gail Hamilton to invest $50,000 into the 
purchase of oxygen equipment. This motion was seconded by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart, and voting was unanimous. 
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Administrator's Report; 
Radiology; 
Commendations were extended to our Radiology Department for the high rating 
they received from the American College of Radiology regarding our ultrasound 
program. This is the first year we have sought this rating, and it is very valuable 
to the department in showing employees and the public that the care they get here 
in ultrasound is the very best. 
THC Contract.: 
The Managed Care Committee met and reviewed the contract from IHC on the 
establishment of BasinMed. Since that time, we have had discussions with Blaine 
Benard who indicated he is not comfortable with several items as they are 
presented. Ray Hussey reported on some basic philosophical items noting that 
over time, changes have occurred from the position of the Memorandum of 
Understanding. We have sought repeatedly to maintain a community basis for 
our plan with us maintaining administrative duties. A clause in the contract states 
that this responsibility will be ours upon joint approval by us and IHC. In 
discussions with IHC, they have indicated that we may never have administrative 
control. Regarding pricing, it was pointed out that our desire was to sell the 
insurance for a bit less initially then later offer more of a discount through risk 
sharing. The prices have come in at 10-20% less, and we are not in a very good 
position to be competitive later. If we only can raise the price later, it will not be 
favorable for our community. If we sell for more now, we don't get the extra 
money, IHC does. Concerns were also expressed regarding the marketing and 
sales of BasinMed. The individual enrollment card has a very small insignia of 
BasinMed, and the booklets don't mention our name. We also want to be 
involved with agents in establishing the program. IHC has retracted our 
involvement sand has announced that SelectMed is in the Basin. When the agent 
sells, we are only providing care for less money. Ray Hussey suggested that we 
research what it would take to get our own license. We could then lease the 
SelectMed network, do the underwriting and market by our own rules. We are 
getting into managed care, doing our own utilization review, and are taking the 
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right steps in the right direction. Blaine Benard recommends not signing the 
contract until we are comfortable with it. A motion was made by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart that we not accept the contract with IHC as it is now and that 
Administration pursue the desired course and sign only when the contract is 
acceptable. Gail Hamilton seconded the motion, and voting was unanimous. 
Draft Document/;: 
Draft Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the PHO have been prepared by 
Blaine Benard using information from Sierra View from California. If the 
physicians could review these documents and come to a consensus, there would 
be strength in having the organization in place when we meet with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. These documents formalize the organization; they do not put 
policies and procedures into place. Legally, we should not represent the 
physicians in a negotiating capacity until the PHO organization is in place. The 
PHO should negotiate as a single entity, not as the IPA and hospital. The IPA is 
doing final reviews and it was suggested that concerns should be addressed 
through an ad hoc committee, perhaps an extension of the Managed Care 
Committee, with any Board Member being invited to participate. A motion was 
made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart that we take another 
month to get prepared and ask the Medical Staff to be ready with their 
organization by next Board Meeting. Voting was unanimous. 
Blue Cross Blue Shield; 
Brad LeBaron asked for clarification in details for negotiating with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. Discussions were held with the School Board and Administration 
regarding Blue Cross Blue Shield contracts. We have sent a letter to Blue Cross 
Blue Shield that we will go off the panel unless we can agree upon renegotiating 
the contract. Through Board direction in the past, we have said we won't give 
anyone a better discount than we give ourselves. 
Medical Staff Development; 
In our recruitment efforts for an additional Pediatrician, we have no viable 
options at this time. We are seriously pursuing another provider for Obstetrics. 
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Dr. Brilliant has indicated he will look somewhere else if an MBA program is 
not available through USU this Fall. 
DiihesnP! Valley Medical f l in ir ; 
Although we had made an offer to Gene Toole, P.A., which he had accepted for 
a position at the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, he has not proven to be 
honorable in his dealings with us. He was scheduled to start on July 1 at the 
DVMC but didn't come nor did he call us. Dr. Pehrson has been helping out in 
the clinic. He also came with a proposal to provide service for the clinic. The 
feeling of the advisory board of the clinic was that they wanted someone to live 
in the community. Roger Marett has talked with Duane Draper, P.A. IN Alaska, 
who has given notice on his job there and will come on August 12. Dr. Pehrson 
came with a second proposal to oversee the clinic and sign off for the P.A. Dr. 
Pehrson will provide full coverage on Monday and Friday for specific hours and 
will work later if patients are coming or appointments are made. The P.A. will 
cover Altamont and Tabiona Monday and Friday and will work on Tuesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. He will work a 12-hour shift in ER on Wednesday and also 
do another shift in Altamont. This would give Monday, Wednesday, Friday 
coverage in Altamont; Monday and Friday coverage in Tabiona; physician 
coverage Monday and Friday and P.A. coverage Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. We can cover all the clinics this way. Dr. Hal Mitchell 
has indicated that if Dr. Pehrson is willing to make a larger commitment, then he 
should be given the opportunity to do so. Dr. Smith has also given notice that he 
won't be going to Altamont. 
Duane Draper, P.A., will receive $52,000 a year, his housing, benefits and 
mileage plus some ER shifts. 
Out.patip,nf Pharmacy: 
We are currently getting reports on medical systems, shelving and layouts for the 
outpatient pharmacy. We are also recruiting a pharmacist. We will be talking 
once again with Don Truman and Bob Benson next week. They would like to 
hear our offer for buying their pharmacy business. We feel $100,000 to 
UB282 
Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes 
July 18, 1996 
Page 9 of 10 
$120,000 is a top offer for what Basin Pharmacy has. Several options for 
pharmacists were discussed with salary ranges from $50,000 to $75,000 
annually. 
ARCH Directorship: 
Mark Dalley, who has significant experience in hospital management, comes to 
ARCH as the new Director. Next Tuesday, a strategic planning meeting will be 
held.. Mark Stoddard's group has been invited to join in this discussion process. 
Funding for ARCH runs out in September of next year. The question remains as 
to whether we are going to be financially able to keep the organization viable. 
The only revenue generation is the $5,000 paid by each member hospital in 
annual dues. Frontier Recovery is a separate service which generates between 
$50,000 and $60,000, a great portion of which is at our expense. 
Mileage Policy; 
Brad LeBaron presented to the Board a policy regarding mileage reimbursement 
for meetings relating to Board service. This policy will allow for Board 
members to submit a form for meetings attended in addition to the regularly 
scheduled monthly Board Meeting. This will not mean another stipend over the 
one received by the Board for the monthly meeting. 
Answering Machines/Fay Machines; 
Due to the difficulty experienced in contacting Board Members on numerous 
occasions, a discussion was held regarding the purchase of answering machines 
and/or fax machines as a better means of communication between the hospital 
and the Board. 
Advertising: 
Concern has been expressed over the marketing impact Ashley Valley is making 
with ads on TV and the radio. Brad LeBaron and Kyla Allred met with Josh 
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Graham, marketing and advertising consultant, who has been commissioned to 
put together an advertising campaign for us. 
Harry Fieldsted, Chairman 
Exhibit D 
Uintah Basin Medical Center 
250 West 300 North 75-2 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Bradley D. LeBaron, Administrator 
(801)-722-4691 
Fax (801) 722-9291 
July 29, 1996 
Leo W. Hardy, MD 
P.O. 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy, 
As a followup to our telephone conference of July 26, 1996 and pursuant to the 
terms of our agreement dated November 29,1994 item #11 which allows for a 
90-day termination period, I am hereby giving you notice of termination of our 
contract effective October 29, 1996. 
This same section of our contract allows for a shorter length of termination by 
mutual consent. In our phone conversation, you agreed to work out the 90-day 
termination period. 
On behalf of our Board, Medical Staff, and patients, I offer our sincere 
appreciation for your services to our hospital and patients. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D. LeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
